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Agents compete to solve a problem. Each agent knows own computational capacity
as private information and simultaneously chooses either a risky or a safe problem
solving method. This paper analyzes the optimal prize schemes from the perspective
of the prize designer who wishes to ￿nd a solution as quick as possible. It is shown
that (i) the winner-take-all scheme can induce excessive risk taking and make problem
solving slower (ii) prize schemes with milder competitive pressure induce the optimal
risk taking and quicker problem solving.
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 0831 Introduction
The X-prize foundation, one of leading innovation prize organizers, claims that risk taking
is the key factor for quicker breakthroughs and innovation prizes e⁄ectively induce the risk
taking. On the other hand, when all agents take a risky method and all methods are failed,
the risk taking can make innovation slower. This paper analyzes the condition in which a
winner-take-all competition makes problem solving slower because of ￿excessive￿risk taking.
Then, it is shown that some prize schemes with milder competitive pressure can induce the
optimal risk taking and quicker problem solving.
This paper focuses on the speci￿c aspect of problem solving: risk taking. The riskiness
of problem solving methods is one of the key choice variables in innovation races. For
example, in the Human Genome Project, National Institute of Health (NIH) and Celera
genomics compete for determining the sequence of chemical based pairs for human DNA.
NIH employed a well known safe method and Celera genomics employed a new method whose
e⁄ectiveness was unknown. In this paper, there are a safe method and a risky method for
problem solving. In the safe method, the agent knows when he ￿nds out a solution given
his computational capacity or budget. Thus, the safe method guarantees the time to get a
solution as long as he spends a su¢ cient amount of time. The safe method can be interpreted
as an established method in which the time to ￿nd a solution is approximately known given
his ability or budget. On the other hand, in the risky method, the performance depends on
his luck and the agent only knows the probability distribution of the time to ￿nd a solution.
Thus, in the risky method, the agent can ￿nd a solution very quickly if he is lucky but it
can take longer time than the safe method. One interpretation of the risky method is a
trial-and-error process with new ideas.
In the ￿rst part of this paper, I focus on problem solving in a popular prize scheme,
winner-take-all competition. The basic setting is introduced in Section 2. The model consists
of two agents who face a common problem and only the ￿rst agent who solves the problem
gets a prize. Each agent simultaneously chooses a problem solving method in the beginning
of the game. In Section 3, it is shown that the game has a unique symmetric equilibrium
which has a cuto⁄ property.
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designer. The prize designer is impatient and wishes to ￿nd a solution as early as possible.
Two kinds of prize designers, an expected utility maximizer and a worst case maximizer, are
considered. Then, the optimal problem solving is de￿ned as a strategy pro￿le which induces
the optimal risk taking, i.e., the strategy pro￿le which maximizes the designer￿ s interest. It
is shown that, in the winner-take-all competition, the optimal problem solving cannot be the
equilibrium for "di¢ cult" problems because of excessive risk taking.
In Section 5, prize schemes which induce the optimal risk taking are analyzed. A prize
scheme is optimal if the optimal problem solving is an equilibrium under the prize scheme.
Two classes of prize schemes are introduced. The ￿rst is a multi-prize scheme in which prizes
are awarded not only to the ￿rst but also to the second winner. Second is a probabilistic prize
scheme in which the prize is determined by the winner-take-all basis with some probability
and an absolute performance basis with some probability. The optimal prize scheme is
analyzed for each class and it is shown that the key to induce the optimal risk taking is the
choice of "right" competitive pressure.
Section 6 extends our analysis to a "costly problem solving" environment where each
agent has another task in addition to problem solving and the prize designer has to take
into account the participation constraint. Each agent has a safe task which guarantees a
small payo⁄ but if he focuses on the safe task, it deteriorates the quality of the problem
solving. In this setting, since the prize designer cannot observe the choice of the task, there
is moral hazard problem. On the other hand, this multi-task environment makes the bene￿t
of competitive schemes clear. That is, the competitive pressure provides the incentive to
focus on problem solving. Then, the question is whether we can provide a reasonable level
of competitive pressure which does not induce the excessive risk taking behavior yet still
provides incentive to participate the competition. It is shown that when the payo⁄from the
safe task is su¢ ciently low and the lack of the e⁄ort deteriorates the speed of his problem
solving signi￿cantly, there is a prize scheme which induces the optimal problem solving. The
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except for one aspect: there is a deadline for the problem solving in which the agent cannot
get any prize from the competition after the deadline.
Related literature. Since agents compete to ￿nd a solution, this model is related to
strategic search models. In most of strategic search models, the intensity of search is a key
choice variable, e.g., Fershtman and Rubinstein (1997), R&D race models such as Dasgupta
and Stiglitz (1980). However, this paper focuses on the di⁄erent aspect "how to solve it."
I restrict our attention to the situation where "how hard we think" is much less important
than "how to solve." For example, when the budget is already determined, most of scientists
try to utilize their time and budget as much as possible. Then, the key choice variable is
their approach to solve the problem.
The winner-take-all competition induces an excessive risk taking behavior for some prob-
lems in our model. Risk taking in winner-take-all environments is well known, e.g., Tirole
(1988), Dekel and Scotchmer (1999), Hvide (2002). Unlike their models, risk taking itself is
not main interest of our paper. The focus of our paper is ￿excessive" risk taking and prize
schemes which eliminate the excessive risk taking and induce the optimal risk taking.
This paper is also related to contest and tournament literature. In most of contest and
tournament models, each agent chooses the e⁄ort or investment level, e.g., Lazear and Rosen
(1981). On the other hand, in my model, the main interest is in the risk taking in problem
solving. There are not many models which take into account risk taking in contest. Hvide
(2002), Hvide and Kristiansen (2003), and Krakel (2008) analyzed risk taking in contest and
provide some interesting economic implications, e.g., explanation of the relative performance
evaluation puzzle. Unlike their papers, the main interest of our paper is in the design of the
prize scheme. Thus, this paper is also related to contest/tournament design literatures, e.g.,
Taylor (1995), Moldovanu and Sela (2001, 2006), Che and Gale (2003). The main di⁄erence
is that they design contest/tournament to induce the optimal e⁄ort or investment level. On
the other hand, our prize scheme is designed to induce the optimal risk taking.
3
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Basics. Time is continuous and indexed by t 2 [0;1) = T : There are two agents, i = 1;2
who compete to solve a problem under a prize scheme. Let t￿
i be the time at which agent
i ￿nds a solution and (t￿
1;t￿
2) be an outcome of problem solving. Let Z = R+ be the set of
prizes. Then, the prize function for agent i is a mapping bi : T 2 ! (T ￿ Z) [ f?g which
speci￿es the amount of prize z 2 Z and its delivery timing given (t￿
1;t￿
2) where f?g denotes





Each agent has the same time preference. Let ui(z;t) be the utility of agent i from prize
z at time t: Then, I assume that ui(z;t) = v(z)￿(t) where v(z) is strictly increasing in z
and v(0) = 0: ￿(t) is a time discount function which is continuous, strictly decreasing in t;
limt!1 ￿(t) = 0 and limt!0 ￿(t) = 1: In short, agents are impatient and the payo⁄ from any
size of prize goes to zero as the delivery timing goes to in￿nity.
Winner-take-all competition. In the ￿rst part of this paper, I focus on the winner-take-all



















Obviously, we can de￿ne a variation of the winner-take-all prize scheme by changing the
prize rule at t￿
i = t￿
j: However, the probability of such outcome is zero and thus it has no
e⁄ect on the equilibrium analysis.
Problem solving strategy. When ￿nding a solution is not immediate but time-consuming
process, "how to solve it" becomes another decision problem. There are two qualita-
tively di⁄erent approaches to solving problems. One is a safe method and the other is
a risky method: Each agent i has private information about his computational capacity
￿i 2 ￿ = [￿min;￿max] ￿ (0;1) and ￿i is independently drawn from an absolutely continuous
distribution function G(￿) with supp(g) = ￿: Then, if agent i chooses the safe method; he
￿nds a solution for sure at t = ￿i 2 ￿ but he has no chance to ￿nd the solution before ￿i:
On the other hand, if agent i chooses the risky method, he does not know how much time
he needs to ￿nd a solution. More concretely, the time at which agent i ￿nds a solution ti is
4
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but ti is not observable for either agent. Notice that the risky method can take time to ￿nd
a solution at most T:1 I assume that ￿(t) is common knowledge and T > ￿max.
Timing of the game. The game consists of the following two steps.
Stage 1. Nature independently draws the type of each agent using G(￿): Each agent
observes own type ￿i and chooses a problem solving method.
Stage 2. Each agent applies his problem solving method. Then, based on the prize
scheme, the prize is awarded to each agent.
Equilibrium. A problem solving strategy of agent i is a mapping ￿i : ￿ ! fS;Rg where
S denotes the safe method and R denotes the risky method2. Let Ui(￿1;￿2;￿1;￿2) be the
expected payo⁄ to player i given a strategy pro￿le (￿1;￿2), a type pro￿le (￿1;￿2): Then, the





for all ￿i 2 ￿i:
3 Equilibrium analysis
In this section, I show that there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium: First, I introduce a
class of strategies which plays an important role in the analysis.




￿i(￿i) = S if ￿i 2 [￿min;^ ￿i)
￿i(￿i) = R if ￿i 2 (^ ￿i;￿max]
:
An equilibrium is cut o⁄ equilibrium if it consists of cut o⁄ strategies.
In another words, in a cut o⁄ strategy, all types which play the safe method have larger
capacity than the cuto⁄ level.
1The result of this paper is preserved even if we allow to have T = 1:
2I focus on pure strategies since the set of types who play a mixed strategy in equilibrium is always
measure zero.
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no symmetric equilibrium in which ^ ￿i = ^ ￿j = ￿max.
Proof. See appendix.
Remark 1. Observe that if the risky method tends to take a long time, type ￿max prefers
to play the safe method in individual problem solving. However, type ￿max never plays the
safe method in the equilibrium of the winner-take-all competition.
The intuition of lemma 1 is the following. First, there is no equilibrium where all agents
plays the safe method for all ￿: This is because, if all agents play the safe method, type
￿max knows that he has no chance to solve the problem earlier than the other agent and his
payo⁄is zero for sure. Secondly, whenever an agent plays the safe method in equilibrium, his
strategy is a cut o⁄ strategy. The idea is simple. If type ￿
0 ￿nds that there is no pro￿table
deviation from the safe method; then any ￿ < ￿
0 ￿nds the safe method more pro￿table than
the risky method.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium.
The idea of Proposition 1 is the following. First, since the expected payo⁄ of agent i
from the safe method is decreasing in ￿i and the expected payo⁄ from the risky method
is independent of ￿i; whenever there exists a common cut o⁄ type for each player who is
indi⁄erent between the safe method and the risky method, the common cuto⁄ type is an
equilibrium cuto⁄. Second, we can show that if there exists one cut o⁄ type which satis￿es
the indi⁄erence condition for each player, there is no other cut o⁄ type which also does so.
Roughly speaking, this is because the di⁄erence between the expected payo⁄ to the risky
method and that to the safe method for the cut o⁄ type becomes higher if the cut o⁄ level
is higher. Hence, if there are two equilibrium cut o⁄ types and the indi⁄erence condition is
satis￿ed for the lower cut o⁄ type, the condition cannot be satis￿ed for the larger cut o⁄
type.
Proof. By Lemma 1, every equilibrium is a cut o⁄ equilibrium. Hence, all I need to do
is the following two steps. First, I establish the existence of a symmetric cut o⁄equilibrium.
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introduce the following notation.
The expected payo⁄ of agent i of type ￿i when agent i plays the safe method and agent
j plays the risky method:
Vi;SR(￿i) = (1 ￿ ￿(￿i))u(x;￿i):
The expected payo⁄ of agent i given his opponent￿ s type is ￿j when agent i plays the









 (t)(1 ￿ ￿(t))u(x;t)dt:






u(x;￿i) if ￿i < ￿j
0 if ￿i > ￿j
:
Step 1. The construction of the equilibrium cuto⁄.
Suppose both agents follows the same cut o⁄strategy and let ^ ￿ be the symmetric cut o⁄
type. Then, the expected payo⁄ of agent i of type ^ ￿ from the risky method is




The expected payo⁄ of agent i of type ^ ￿ from the safe method is
UiS(^ ￿) = (1 ￿ G(^ ￿))Vi;SR(^ ￿):
Then, let z(^ ￿) be the di⁄erence between the expected payo⁄ to the risky method and
that to the safe method for cut o⁄ type ^ ￿; that is,
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R
￿j<^ ￿ Vi;RS(￿j)dG(￿j) > 0: Hence, if 8￿ 2 ￿;Vi;RR ￿ Vi;SR(￿i); then z(^ ￿) > 0
for all ￿: In this case, the equilibrium cut o⁄ type is ￿min: That is, all agents play the risky
method. There is no pro￿table deviation since 8￿ 2 ￿;Vi;RR ￿ Vi;SR(￿): So assume that
there exists some ￿ 2 ￿ with Vi;RR < Vi;SR(￿):
Notice that Vi;RR ￿ Vi;SR(￿i) has the smallest value when ￿i = ￿min: Thus, if Vi;RR <
Vi;SR(￿i) for some ￿; then z(￿min) < 0: On the other hand, z(￿max) =
R
￿j Vi;RS(￿j)dG(￿j) > 0:
Since Vi;SR(^ ￿) is continuous in ^ ￿; z(^ ￿) is also continuous. Hence, there exists at least one
^ ￿
￿
2 int(￿) such that z(^ ￿
￿
) = 0: I claim that a symmetric cut o⁄ strategy pro￿le with ^ ￿
￿
constitutes an equilibrium. To verify the claim, suppose each agent plays the safe method
for ￿ 2 [￿min;^ ￿
￿
) and plays the risky method for ￿ 2 (^ ￿
￿
;￿max]. Since Vi;SR(￿i) is decreasing
in ￿i; by construction, for any ￿i > ^ ￿
￿
;






￿ (1 ￿ G(^ ￿
￿
))Vi;SR(￿i):
For any ￿i 2 [￿min;^ ￿
￿
);
(1 ￿ G(^ ￿
￿
))Vi;SR(￿i) + G(^ ￿
￿
)u(x;￿i)






Step 2. There exists unique equilibrium cuto⁄ ^ ￿
￿
.
Recall that ^ ￿
￿





￿ Vi;RS(￿j)dG(￿j) = 0
if such ^ ￿ exists and ^ ￿
￿
= ￿min otherwise. Thus, I need to show that z(^ ￿) = 0 has unique
solution whenever it exists. Notice that Vi;RR ￿ Vi;SR(^ ￿) is increasing in ^ ￿ since Vi;SR(^ ￿) is
decreasing in ^ ￿: Thus, once Vi;RR ￿ Vi;SR(^ ￿) > 0; then z(^ ￿) > 0 for larger ^ ￿: On the other
hand, whenever there exists a cut o⁄ equilibrium with ^ ￿
￿
6= ￿min, Vi;RR ￿ Vi;SR(￿min) < 0:
Obviously, since Vi;RS(￿j) > 0; z(^ ￿) is increasing in ^ ￿ as long as Vi;RR ￿ Vi;SR(^ ￿) < 0: Then,
since Vi;RR ￿ Vi;SR(^ ￿
￿
) < 0; there exists unique ^ ￿
￿
: Q.E.D.
Remark 2. If a problem is su¢ ciently "di¢ cult" for the risky method in the sense that
T is large and ￿(T=2) is small, there is no asymmetric equilibrium and thus the symmetric
cut o⁄ is the unique equilibrium.
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The following is the intuition. Suppose we have an asymmetric equilibrium. Then, the
agent with the lower cut o⁄ type has a extra chance to have larger capacity than the other
agent when both play the safe method. Hence, the agent with the lower cut o⁄ type has a
higher expected payo⁄ from the safe method and this is not a⁄ected by ￿(t). On the other
hand, if ￿(t) is su¢ ciently small for a su¢ ciently large set of t￿ s, the expected payo⁄from the
risky method is small and the di⁄erence of expected payo⁄s from the risky method is small
between agents. As a result, under asymmetric cut o⁄s, we cannot make the expected payo⁄s
from the safe method and the risky method indi⁄erent for both cut o⁄ types. Moreover, if
a problem is su¢ ciently easy in the sense that ￿(￿min) is large, there is no asymmetric
equilibrium. The reason is simple. The risky method is the dominant strategy if ￿(￿min) is
large.
Before moving to the next section, I compare competitive problem solving with individual
problem solving. Given type ￿i; agent i plays the safe method (the risky method) in individual
problem solving if and only if
Z T
0
 (t)u(x;t)dt < (>)u(x;￿i):
Then, let ￿
Ind be the cut o⁄ type which characterizes the individual decision rule. That is,
if ￿i > (<)￿
Ind; the optimal choice is the risky (safe) method. First, it is easy to see that if
￿(￿min) is large, all agents play the risky method in both competitive problem solving and
individual problem solving, i.e., ￿min = ^ ￿
￿
= ￿
Ind: Second, if ￿(￿max) is small, then all types
play the safe method in individual problem solving, i.e., ￿
Ind = ￿max. On the other hand, by
Lemma 1, ￿
Ind > ^ ￿
￿
:
The important point is that the meaning of "capacity" depends on whether there is a
competitor or not. The agent takes into account his capacity relative to the opponent to
choose the problem solving strategy when there is a competitor. On the other hand, in
individual problem solving, relative capacity is meaningless. That is, even if the agent has
￿max; he plays the safe method as long as the expected time to ￿nd a solution is shorter than
that in the risky method. Thus, if a problem is su¢ ciently "di¢ cult", all types play the safe
method in individual problem solving.
9
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In this section, I de￿ne optimal problem solving from the perspective of the prize designer.
Suppose the prize designer￿ s interest is in obtaining a solution as early as possible. Formally,
let t￿
i be the time at which agent i ￿nds a solution and let t￿ = minft￿
1;t￿
2g: By obtaining
a solution of the problem, the prize designer gets pro￿t B > 0 at t￿: The payo⁄ of the
prize designer from B at t￿ is e u(B;t￿) = e v(B)￿(t￿) where e v(B) > 0: I assume that the prize
designer shares the same time discount function ￿(t￿) with agents. Let ￿ be the probability
distribution of t￿ induced by a problem solving pro￿le. Then, W(￿) denotes the utility of the
prize designer from ￿: I assume that the total budget of the prize is x > 0 and spending less
than the budget does not improve the prize designer￿ s payo⁄. Hence, the objective function
of the prize designer is W(￿):
Now, consider a pair of mapping (y1(￿1;￿2);y2(￿1;￿2)) where yi : ￿2 ! fS;Rg: Then, let
￿y1(￿1;￿2);y2(￿1;￿2) be the distribution of t￿ given (y1(￿1;￿2);y2(￿1;￿2)): Then, I de￿ne optimal




given any (￿1;￿2): In short, this is the pair of problem solving methods the prize designer
prefers to assign when the type pro￿le is observable.
Since the type is private information in this model, I also introduce a criterion which
takes into account the informational constraint. Let ￿￿1(￿1);￿2(￿2) be the distribution of t￿
given strategy pro￿le (￿1(￿1);￿2(￿2)): I de￿ne optimal problem solving (OPS) as a strategy






In this paper, I consider two kinds speci￿cations of W(￿) depending on how the prize
designer aggregates the utility index e u(B;t￿) across t￿: First, the prize designer is an expected
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solution before the deadline3. In this case, the prize designer￿ s concern may be how much
time might be needed in the worst case to ￿nd out a solution. The prize designer is a worst





Now, I turn to the analysis of the equilibrium problem solving in the winner-take-all
scheme. For the ￿rst part of the analysis, I focus on the case where the prize designer is the
expected utility maximizer. I start from the analysis of "di¢ cult" problems:
Observation 1.
Suppose the prize designer is the expected utility maximizer.
(i) If T is large and ￿(T=2) is su¢ ciently small, then the OPSA is y￿
i(￿i;￿j) = R and
y￿
j(￿i;￿j) = S for ￿i > ￿j:
(ii) If T is large and ￿(T=2) is su¢ ciently small, the OPS consists of a symmetric cut
o⁄ strategy pro￿le.
Proof. See appendix.
Since all equilibria are cuto⁄ equilibrium, the winner-take-all game induces the OPSA
for su¢ ciently "di¢ cult" problems only if ￿i < ^ ￿ < ￿j given equilibrium cuto⁄^ ￿: Otherwise,
the equilibrium problem solving is not the OPSA.
On the other hand, the following proposition states that the winner-take-all game induces
the excessive risk taking and cannot induce the OPS for "di¢ cult" problems.
Proposition 2. Suppose the prize designer is the expected utility maximizer. If T is
large and ￿(T=2) is su¢ ciently small, then the symmetric equilibrium cut o⁄ type is smaller
than the cut o⁄ type in the OPS.
Proof. See appendix.
Let ^ ￿OPS be the cuto⁄type for the OPS. Proposition 2 says that if a problem is su¢ ciently
"di¢ cult" for the risky method, competition forces the agent with moderate capacity, i.e.,
3In computer science, average-case and worst-case performance are popular criteria to evaluate algorithms.
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￿
;^ ￿OPS); to employ the risky method, i.e., excessive risk taking. The intuition is the
following. In the winner-take-all game, when an agent plays the safe method, the expected
payo⁄ depends on the type of the agent. On the other hand, when he employs the risky
method; the expected payo⁄ is independent of his type. Thus, when an agent plays the
safe method in equilibrium, his capacity has to be large enough to win the game with a
reasonably high probability. As a result, an agent with moderate capacity employs the risky
method in equilibrium. On the other hand, notice that if both agents play the risky method,
the time to ￿nd a solution can be long. Then, to reduce the chance of having such situation,
the agent with moderate capacity is assigned to the safe method in the OPS.
Now, I turn to the analysis for "easy" problems, i.e., ￿(￿min) is high.
Observation 2. Suppose the prize designer is the expected utility maximizer. If ￿(￿min)
is su¢ ciently large, both agents play the risky method in both the OPSA and the OPS.
Proof. The expected utility of the prize designer in which both agents employ the risky
method is at least Z ￿min
0
[1 ￿ (1 ￿  (t))
2]e u(B;t)dt:
On the other hand, if an agent with higher capacity plays the safe method and the other
employs the risky method, the expected utility for the prize designer is at most
Z ￿min
0
 (t)e u(B;t)dt + (1 ￿ ￿(￿min))e u(B;￿min)
Notice that [1 ￿ (1 ￿  (t))2] = 2 (t) ￿  (t)2 >  (t). Hence, the expected utility of the
prize designer in which both agents play the risky method is higher if
￿(￿min) ￿ 1 ￿
R ￿min




The following proposition shows that the equilibrium can be the OPSA and the OPS for
su¢ ciently "easy" problems.
Proposition 3. Suppose the prize designer is the expected utility maximizer. If ￿(￿min)
is su¢ ciently large, the symmetric equilibrium is the OPSA.
12
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is ￿min for large ￿(￿min): Q.E.D.
Now, I turn to the analysis in which the prize designer is the worst case maximizer.
Observation 3. Suppose the prize designer is the worst case maximizer.
(i) ￿i ￿ ￿j, then (y1(￿1;￿2);y2(￿1;￿2)) is the OPSA whenever y￿
j(￿i;￿j) = S:
(ii) The OPS consists of a set of strategy pro￿les such that there exists agent i who plays
the safe method for any ￿i.
Note that the OPSA and the OPS do not depend on the "di¢ culty" of the problem. For
the OPSA, since the prize designer knows that the worst case of the safe method is better
than that of the risky method, he can maximize his payo⁄ by assigning the safe method to
the agent with larger capacity. For the OPS, observe that whenever each of agent has a set
of types in which he plays the risky method, the prize designer￿ s payo⁄ is e u(B;T): On the
other hand, when one of agents employ the safe method independent of his type, the prize
designer￿ s payo⁄ is e u(B;￿max) > e u(B;T):
The next proposition says when the prize designer is the worst case maximizer, he can
be better o⁄ by asking one agent to solve the problem without competition.
Proposition 4. Suppose the prize designer is the worst case maximizer. The symmetric
equilibrium cannot be the OPS for any problem. Moreover, if T is large and ￿(T=2) is
su¢ ciently small, then the prize designer gets higher payo⁄ by asking one agent to solve the
problem rather than setting 2-person winner-take-all competition.
Proof. The ￿rst part is immediate from Lemma 1, and observation 3. For the second
part, consider individual problem solving with large T and small ￿(T=2): Then, the optimal
problem solving in the individual decision problem is to choose the safe method for all types.
Note that the prize designer￿ s payo⁄ is at least e u(B;￿max) if he asks one agent to solve the
problem. On the other hand, by Lemma1, the prize designer￿ s payo⁄from the winner-take-all
competition setting is always e u(B;T): Q.E.D.
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When a problem is "di¢ cult" for the risky method, the winner-take-all competition does not
induce the OPS. This section introduces prize schemes which induce the OPS in an equilib-
rium. Recall that, for "di¢ cult" problems, the competitive pressure induces the excessive
risk taking in the equilibrium. Hence, the key to induce the OPS is reduce the competitive
pressure of the winner-take-all scheme. I provide two kinds of such prize schemes. The ￿rst
is a multi-prize scheme. In this prize scheme, unlike the winner-take-all game, not only the
winner but also the loser gets some reward. The second is a probabilistic prize scheme in
which both agents do not know the exact prize structure when they choose the problem solv-
ing method. The prize structure is drawn from a set of prize structures and the distribution
is known to both agents.
If the focus of the analysis is "costless problem solving," i.e., participating problem solving
is not costly, there is a noncompetitive scheme which can induce the OPS. A reward scheme
is cooperative if both agents share prize x when the ￿rst agent ￿nds a solution.
Observation 4. Suppose the prize designer is the expected utility maximizer. The OPS
is an equilibrium under the cooperative scheme.
A drawback of the cooperative scheme is that the implementation of the OPS relies on
the "costless problem solving" setting. When it is costly to participate problem solving,
e.g., there is an outside option, the cooperative scheme faces free rider problem. Then, this
section focuses on competitive schemes so that we can extend the analysis for a "costly
problem solving" environment in the later section.
Now, I introduce the key concept of this section.
De￿nition 2. An optimal prize scheme is a prize scheme which induces the OPS in an
equilibrium.
That is, in the optimal prize scheme, the strategy pro￿le which maximizes the prize
designer￿ s interest can be supported as an equilibrium. In this section, without loss of
generality, I focus on the class of prize schemes in which the total amount of prizes is no
more than x > 0:
14
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In the winner-take-all competition, only the winner receives a prize. Multi-prize scheme is
a prize scheme in which the loser also receives a prize. Concretely, the prize designer gives
￿ 2 [0;x] to the loser and x￿￿ to the winner at the time the agent ￿nds a solution. Formally,





















Notice that since the agent can be rewarded even if he does not win the game, the
competitive pressure of this game is lower than that of the winner-take-all game. Now,
the question is whether we can ￿nd the second prize level ￿ which makes the prize scheme
optimal.
The following proposition says that, for su¢ ciently "di¢ cult" problems, there exists an
optimal multi-prize scheme.
Proposition 5.
(i) Suppose the prize designer is the expected utility maximizer. If T is su¢ ciently large
and ￿(T=2) is su¢ ciently small, then there exists ￿





(ii) Suppose the prize designer is the worst case maximizer. If T is su¢ ciently large
and ￿(T=2) is su¢ ciently small, then b(t￿
1;t￿
2j￿) is the optimal prize scheme whenever ￿ is
su¢ ciently close to x=2.
To provide an intuition, recall that, for both criteria, the optimal prize scheme has to
eliminate the excessive risk taking behavior for "di¢ cult" problems. Observe that when the
loser can get a prize based on the time he ￿nds a solution, the risk taking is not attractive
choice whenever (i) the chance of being the loser is high and (ii) the problem is "di¢ cult."
Thus, when the loser can get a prize, it reduces the bene￿t from the risk taking for larger
capacity types. Then, when the prize designer provides a right amount of prize to the
loser, the prize scheme can eliminate excessive risk taking and maximize the prize designer￿ s
expected payo⁄.
15
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^ UR(^ ￿j￿) = (1 ￿ G(^ ￿))
￿Z T
0

















Given ￿; the expected payo⁄ of the cuto⁄ type from the safe method is
^ US(^ ￿j￿) = (1 ￿ G(^ ￿))
h








^ US(^ ￿jx=2) = u(x=2;^ ￿):
Moreover, recall that, when the game is the winner-take-all game, the expected payo⁄
from each action is
UR(^ ￿) = (1 ￿ G(^ ￿))
Z T
0







US(^ ￿) = (1 ￿ G(^ ￿))(1 ￿ ￿(^ ￿))u(x;^ ￿):
Then, let zmulti(^ ￿j￿) = ^ UR(^ ￿j￿) ￿ ^ US(^ ￿j￿) and note that
zmulti(^ ￿j0) = z(^ ￿) = UR(^ ￿) ￿ US(^ ￿);
zmulti(^ ￿jx=2) = ^ UR(^ ￿jx=2) ￿ ^ US(^ ￿jx=2):
Suppose the prize designer is the expected utility maximizer. Recall that, when the prob-
lem has su¢ ciently large T and su¢ ciently small ￿(T=2); we have z(^ ￿OPS) > 0: Moreover, it
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small ￿(T=2): Then, since zmulti(^ ￿OPSj￿) is continuous in ￿; there always exists ￿
￿ 2 (0;x=2)
such that zmulti(^ ￿OPSj￿
￿) = 0:
Suppose the prize designer is the worst case maximizer. If T is su¢ ciently large and
￿(T=2) is su¢ ciently small, at least one of agents play the safe method in the OPS. Obviously,
if T is su¢ ciently large and ￿(T=2) is su¢ ciently small, we have zmulti(^ ￿jx=2) < 0 for all
^ ￿: Then, given large T and su¢ ciently small ￿(T=2); if ￿ is su¢ ciently close to x=2; then,
by continuity, zmulti(^ ￿j￿) < 0 for all ^ ￿: Then, all agents choose the safe method in the
equilibrium. This is the OPS. Q.E.D.
5.2 Probabilistic prize scheme
Suppose the prize structure is not known among agents when each agent chooses a problem
solving method. Concretely, suppose there are two possible prize structures, i.e., the winner-
take-all and an absolute performance basis prize. In the winner-take-all competition, the
agent is rewarded only if he ￿nds a solution earlier than the other, i.e., being winner. The
absolute performance basis prize means that the reward is based only on the time the agent
￿nds a solution. Then, a probabilistic prize scheme is characterized by the probability that
the prize structure is the winner-take-all competition. Concretely, the probabilistic prize
scheme b(t￿
1;t￿











j) with probability q
bi;abs(t￿
i;t￿






















j) = x=2 at t
￿
i:
Notice that since the agent faces no competition with probability 1 ￿ q, the competitive
pressure of this game is lower than that of the winner-take-all game.
The time line of the game is as follows.
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one of prize structures is chosen by the prize designer but this is not observable for agents.
Step 2. Given q; each agent chooses his problem solving strategy. When the agent ￿nds
a solution, he receives the prize based on the prize structure.
The next proposition shows that, for each criterion, there exists probability q which
induces the OPS in an equilibrium.
Proposition 6.
(i) Suppose the prize designer is the expected utility maximizer. If T is su¢ ciently large




(ii) Suppose the prize designer is the worst case maximizer. If T is su¢ ciently large and
￿(T=2) is su¢ ciently small, b(t￿
1;t￿
2jq) is the optimal prize scheme for su¢ ciently small q.
The reason that this scheme eliminates the risk taking behavior is similar to that of the
multi-prize scheme. When agents face the absolute performance basis prize structure with
some probability, the incentive of risk taking is lower for "di¢ cult" problems. Then, we can
always ￿nd a probability which eliminates the excessive risk taking.
Proof. Given q; the expected payo⁄ of ^ ￿ from the risky method is
UiR(^ ￿jq) = q
"









On the other hand, given q; the expected payo⁄ of ^ ￿ from the safe method is
UiS(^ ￿jq) = q(1 ￿ G(^ ￿))Vi;SR(^ ￿) + (1 ￿ q)u(x=2;^ ￿):
Recall that z(^ ￿) is the di⁄erence of expected payo⁄s between the risky method and the
safe method in the winner-take-all scheme. Then, let zrand(^ ￿jq) be the di⁄erence of expected
payo⁄s between the risky method and the safe method in which the type ^ ￿ faces the winner-
take-all game with probability q: That is,
zrand(^ ￿jq) = qz(^ ￿) + (1 ￿ q)
￿Z T
0
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OPSjq) is continuous and strictly increasing in q; we always ￿nd a
unique q￿ 2 (0;1) such that z(￿
￿
OPSjq￿) = 0:
Suppose the prize designer is the worst case maximizer, observe that zrand(^ ￿j0) < 0 for
all ^ ￿ if T is su¢ ciently large and ￿(T=2) is su¢ ciently small. Then, by continuity, whenever
q is su¢ ciently close to 0, zrand(^ ￿jq) < 0 for all ^ ￿: Then, the symmetric equilibrium is the
OPS. Q.E.D.
Remark 3. The multi-prize scheme and the probabilistic prize scheme are similar in the
sense that it reduces the competitive pressure to induce the OPS. However, one clear merit of
the probabilistic prize scheme over the multi-prize scheme is the following. Consider the case
where there are I agents. Moreover, suppose the OPS is characterized by a symmetric cuto⁄
type. Then, it is easy to ￿nd the optimal probabilistic prize scheme since all we need to ￿nd
is the probability q: On the other hand, it is more di¢ cult to ￿nd the optimal multi-prize
structure for I prizes.
6 A multi-task environment and participation constraint
When agents have another task in addition to problem solving, the agent has to decide which
task he focuses on, i.e., a costly problem solving. Then, one natural question is whether the
optimal prize scheme in the last section still induces the OPS in a multi-task environment.
To investigate the question, suppose there is a safe task in which the agent gets v > 0 for
sure whenever the agent focuses on the safe task. Then, the agent has to choose whether
he focuses on problem solving or not. Concretely, we add a new action "focusing on the
safe task," denoted by N; to the set of feasible actions. Hence, a strategy of agent i is
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can ￿nd a solution but it tends to take longer time to ￿nd a solution. Concretely, without
e⁄ort, the time at which the agent ￿nds a solution follows probability distribution ￿N(t)
with supp( 
N) = [0;TN] where ￿N(t) < ￿(t) for all t 2 [0;T]: Obviously, it implies TN > T:
I assume that the prize designer gets no bene￿t from the safe task and his objective function
is the same as that of the basic setting. An important assumption here is that the prize
designer of the competition cannot observe whether the agent focuses on problem solving
or not, that is, the choice of "which to focus" is a hidden action. Thus, the prize structure
cannot be conditional on the hidden action.
When we take into account the choice of "which to focus," the bene￿t of competition
becomes clear. The following observation clari￿es the bene￿t of competitive schemes in the
multi-task environment.
Observation 5.
(i) If u(x;0) ￿ u(x;TN) is su¢ ciently small, then the optimal decision in the individual
problem solving is N for all ￿:
(ii) If u(x;0) ￿ u(x;TN) is su¢ ciently small, then there is no equilibrium where both
agents focus on problem solving in the cooperative scheme (Free rider problem).
(iii) In the winner-take-all competition, both agents focus on problem solving in an equi-
librium if v is su¢ ciently small given x.
To see Observation 5 (i), in the individual problem, the expected payo⁄ from focusing
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argument.
To understand Observation 5 (iii), suppose the prize is given by the winner-take-all
fashion and both agents focus on problem solving. Then, if the agent deviates and focuses
on the safe task, he never wins the competition and his payo⁄ is only v: Hence, if v is
su¢ ciently small, there is no incentive to deviate.
The winner-take-all scheme can provide the incentive to participate problem solving but
it also induces the excessive risk taking behavior. Then, our question is whether optimal
prize schemes in the last section can provide the incentive to participate problem solving. Let
bmlt be the optimal multi-prize scheme in the single task environment and brnd be the optimal
probabilistic prize scheme in the single task environment: The next observation says that,
for "di¢ cult" problems, optimal incentive schemes in the single task environment cannot
induce the OPS when agents are su¢ ciently patient.
Observation 6. Suppose T is large and ￿(T=2) is su¢ ciently small so that the OPS
is characterized by symmetric cuto⁄ ^ ￿OPS: Then, if u(x;0)￿u(x;TN) is su¢ ciently small,
type ￿max always has incentive to deviate from the OPS under bmlt and brnd:
Observation 6 says that the optimal prize schemes in the last section do not satisfy the
"participation condition" when agents are su¢ ciently patient. To see the claim, recall that
prize scheme bmlt rewards the loser. When the agent is ￿max and the problem is "di¢ cult", the
probability that he loses the competition is very low. Then, since the safe task guarantees
the payo⁄ v; there is no reason to make an e⁄ort to get the second prize with cost v as
long as he is su¢ ciently patient. The analogous argument can be applied to the case of the
probabilistic prize scheme.
Now, in order to provide the incentive of focusing on problem solving, I introduce the
following class of prize scheme.




1)); a prize scheme with deadline
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"not focusing on problem" for agent i is only v > 0: Let bopt be an optimal prize scheme
when v = 0: The next proposition claims that if (i) the payo⁄ from the safe task is small
and (ii) the lack of focus makes problem solving su¢ ciently slower, the prize scheme with
deadline bD
opt induces the OPS in an equilibrium.
Proposition 7. Suppose ^ ￿OPS 2 int(￿): Given x; if ￿N(T) is su¢ ciently small, there
exists ￿ vx such that bD
opt induces the OPS in an equilibrium if and only if v 2 [0; ￿ vx]:
Proof. "If" part. Given bopt; let ^ UR(^ ￿OPS) be the expected payo⁄ of the equilibrium
cuto⁄ type from the risky method and ^ US(^ ￿OPS) be the expected payo⁄ of the equilibrium
cuto⁄type from the safe method. Then, since ^ ￿OPS 2 int(￿); we have ^ UR(^ ￿OPS) = ^ US(^ ￿OPS)
under bopt: Note that ^ US(^ ￿OPS) and ^ UR(^ ￿OPS) are the same under bD
opt:
Now, suppose one of agents deviate and play N: Then, let Udev
N (￿N)+v be the expected
payo⁄ from the deviation given ￿N where Udev
N (￿N) is the expected payo⁄ from the compe-
tition. Observe that, whenever ￿N(T) is small, ^ US(^ ￿OPS) > Udev
N (￿N): Then, we can ￿nd
v0 > 0 such that ^ US(^ ￿OPS) = Udev
N (￿N) + v0 and let ￿ vx = v0: Obviously, if v ￿ ￿ vx; the cuto⁄
type has no incentive to deviate to N. Thus, the OPS can be induced in an equilibrium
whenever v ￿ ￿ vx:
"Only if" part. Suppose v > ￿ vx: Then, by construction of ￿ vx; the expected payo⁄ of the
cuto⁄ type from N is always strictly higher than that from the OPS. Q.E.D.
To get an intuition, suppose one agent deviates from the OPS. Then, he gets payo⁄ v
for sure and may get the prize from the competition if he can solve the problem before the
deadline. However, if ￿N(T) is smaller, the probability that the agent gets the prize becomes
lower because of the deadline. Hence, whenever both ￿N(T) and v are su¢ ciently low, there
is no incentive to deviate from the OPS.
The prize scheme with deadline does not work well if the lack of the focus does not
deteriorate his performance of problem solving very much. Consider the case that ￿N(T) is
large. Then, the expected payo⁄from N can be high under deadline T: Then, the di⁄erence
between the expected payo⁄ from N and that from the risky method can be small. As a
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 083result, when v is su¢ ciently large, the prize scheme with deadline cannot induce the OPS.
Remark 4. Given a prize scheme, ￿ vx is increasing in the level of prize x: Thus, given
v > 0; we can always ￿nd large x which makes ￿ vx > v:
7 Discussion
This paper shows that the key to induce the optimal risk taking is the choice of competitive
pressure. For instance, it is shown that the second prize can eliminate the excessive risk
taking. The second prize is observed in innovation prizes in the real world. For example, the
Google Lunar X PRIZE has $5 million second prize ($20 million for the ￿rst prize).4 The
X-prize foundation claims innovation prizes are the e⁄ective incentive to induce risk taking
which brings breakthroughs. Thus, if their aim is to encourage the optimal risk taking, their
second prize is consistent with the implication of this paper.
On the other hand, it is important to notice that ￿optimal risk taking￿in this paper
depends on the setting where there is a safe method. For some cases, e.g., sequencing DNA,
this is a reasonable assumption. However, if there is no promising/ safe approach for a
problem, the excessive risk taking is not well de￿ned and the rationale of the second prize
is not clear. This paper implies that whether the problem has relatively "safe" approach or
not can be a key factor for the design of the optimal prize scheme.
8 Summary
In the ￿rst part of this paper, I analyzed the situation where agents compete to solve a
problem in a winner-take-all fashion. Each agent chooses either a risky or a safe method.
￿ The winner-take-all competition induces the problem solving which maximizes the prize
designer￿ s objective when the problem is "easy" for the risky method. However, the
winner-take-all competition induces the excessive risk taking behavior when a problem
is "di¢ cult" for the risky method.
In the second part of this paper, I introduced prize schemes which induce the optimal
risk taking in an equilibrium for those "di¢ cult" problems. The following classes of prize
4http://www.googlelunarxprize.org/lunar/about-the-prize/rules-and-guidelines
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￿ Multi-prize scheme: In this scheme, the designer gives a prize not only to the winner
but also loser. The prize designer chooses the ￿rst and second prizes.
￿ Probabilistic prize scheme: In this scheme, the prize structure is determined by a
lottery. One of prize structures is the winner-take-all and the other is an absolute per-
formance basis prize. Each agent does not know the prize structure when he chooses his
problem solving method but the probability of the prize structure is common knowledge
among agents. The prize designer chooses the probability of each prize structure.
In the extension, I investigated a multi-task environment. Each agent has another "safe"
task and chooses whether he focuses on problem solving or not.
￿ Optimal prize schemes in the basic setting cannot provide the incentive to focus on
problem solving when agents are su¢ ciently patient: Moral hazard problem.
To resolve the problem, I introduced a deadline to the prize schemes. That is, the agent
gets a prize from competition only if he ￿nds a solution before the deadline. Then, I found
the following.
￿ The competition with deadline can provide the incentive to focus on problem solving
and induces the optimal problem solving if the lack of focus deteriorates the perfor-
mance of problem solving signi￿cantly and the payo⁄ from the safe task is su¢ ciently
small.
9 Appendix
9.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Claim 1. There is no equilibrium where all agents play the safe method for all ￿.
Proof of claim 1. Suppose all types play the safe method in equilibrium. Then, the
expected payo⁄ of agent i is (1 ￿ G(￿i))u(x;￿i) which is decreasing in ￿i and goes to 0 as
￿i ! ￿max: On the other hand, if agent i deviates to the risky method; his expected payo⁄
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R
￿j Vi;RS(￿j)dG(￿j) > 0 and constant in ￿i: Hence, for large ￿i; the deviation is always
pro￿table. Q.E.D.
Claim 2. Suppose there exists a pure strategy equilibrium in which ￿i(￿) = S for some ￿.
Then, agent i plays a cut o⁄ strategy in the equilibrium.
Proof of claim 2. Suppose claim 2 is not true. Then, there exists an equilibrium such
that ￿i(￿
0
i) = R for ￿
0 and ￿i(￿
00





i ￿ ￿ be the set of types in which
the equilibrium strategy for agent i is the risky method and ￿S
i ￿ ￿ be the set of types in





























































j Vi;SS(￿i;￿j)dG(￿j) are both strictly decreas-
ing in ￿i; this deviation is always pro￿table as long as C1 holds. A contradiction. Q.E.D.
9.2 Proof of Remark 2
Claim. There is no asymmetric equilibrium if T is large and ￿(T=2) is su¢ ciently small.
Proof. Suppose there exists an equilibrium which consists of cut o⁄ strategies with a
pair of cut o⁄ (^ ￿i;^ ￿j) such that ^ ￿i > ^ ￿j: Then, the expected payo⁄s of agent i and j from
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The expected payo⁄s of agent i and j from the safe method are
UiS(^ ￿ij^ ￿j) = (1 ￿ G(^ ￿j))Vi;SR(^ ￿i)




Notice that, in equilibrium, we need to have UiR = UiS(^ ￿ij^ ￿j) and UjR = UjS(^ ￿jj^ ￿i): I will
show that this is not possible if T is large and ￿(T=2) is su¢ ciently small. Let ^ ￿
￿
be the cut
o⁄ type in a symmetric cut o⁄ equilibrium:





j = ^ ￿i: Notice that if ^ ￿i < ^ ￿
￿
; then z(^ ￿i) < 0 or UjR < UjS(^ ￿
0
jj^ ￿i): On the other hand,
if the cut o⁄ type of agent j is ^ ￿j; UjR stays in the same level but UjS(^ ￿jj^ ￿i) > UjS(^ ￿
0
jj^ ￿i):
Thus, UjR < UjS(^ ￿jj^ ￿i):





i = ^ ￿j: Notice that if ^ ￿j > ^ ￿
￿
; then z(^ ￿j) > 0 or UiR > UiS(^ ￿
0
ij^ ￿j): On the other hand,
if the cut o⁄type of agent i is ^ ￿i > ^ ￿
0
i; UiR stays in the same level but UiS(^ ￿ij^ ￿j) < UiS(^ ￿
0
ij^ ￿j):
Thus, UiR > UiS(^ ￿jj^ ￿j):





j = ^ ￿
0






i) < UjS(^ ￿jj^ ￿
0
i) because ^ ￿j < ^ ￿
0
j and the probability that agent
j wins for sure becomes higher. Moreover, UjR(^ ￿
0
i) < UjS(^ ￿jj^ ￿
0
i) since UjR(^ ￿
0





by de￿nition of ^ ￿
￿
: Now, suppose the cut o⁄ type of agent i is ^ ￿i > ^ ￿
0
i: Then, UjS(^ ￿jj^ ￿
0
i) <
UjS(^ ￿jj^ ￿i): On the other hand, jUjR(^ ￿i)￿UjR(^ ￿
0
i)j can be arbitrarily small by choosing large
T and small ￿(T=2): Thus, UjR(^ ￿i) < UjS(^ ￿jj^ ￿i): Q.E.D.
9.3 Proof of Observation 1
Proof of (i). Immediate.
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i(￿i)
and ￿￿
j(￿j) be the OPS. Then, for each ￿i; a problem solving method ￿￿
i(￿i) maximizes the
expected utility of the prize designer given ￿￿
j(￿j): Now, suppose ￿￿
i(￿
0











i(￿i) = ag and, analogously, I de￿ne ￿a
j ￿ ￿:
Moreover, let Wi;ai;aj(￿i;￿j) be the expected payo⁄ of the prize designer given (ai;aj) and






























































































Second, I show that if T is large and ￿(T=2) is su¢ ciently small, the OPS is a symmetric
cut o⁄ strategy. Given ^ ￿j; the expected payo⁄s for the prize designer in which agent i plays
the risky method is







Note that WiR(^ ￿ij^ ￿j) is constant in ^ ￿i: On the other hand, given ^ ￿j and ^ ￿i; the expected
payo⁄ for the prize designer in which agent i plays the safe method is
WiS(^ ￿ij^ ￿j) =
Z
￿j>^ ￿j
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8
> > > <
> > > :
^ ￿
￿￿
i if there exists ^ ￿
￿￿
i s.t. WiR(^ ￿
￿￿
i j^ ￿j) = WiS(^ ￿
￿￿
i j^ ￿j);
￿min if WiR(^ ￿ij^ ￿j) > WiS(^ ￿ij^ ￿j) for any ^ ￿i 2 ￿;
￿max if WiR(^ ￿ij^ ￿j) < WiS(^ ￿ij^ ￿j) for any ^ ￿i 2 ￿:
Moreover, let f Wia(^ ￿ij^ ￿j) be Wia(^ ￿ij^ ￿j) with ￿(￿max) = 0; that is,




f WiS(^ ￿ij^ ￿j) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
R
￿j<^ ￿j e u(B;￿j)dG(￿j) +
R
￿j>^ ￿j e u(B;^ ￿i)dG(￿j) if ^ ￿i ￿ ^ ￿j
R
￿j2[￿min;^ ￿i) e u(B;￿j)dG(￿j) +
R
￿j2[^ ￿i;^ ￿j) e u(B;^ ￿i)dG(￿j)
+
R
￿j>^ ￿j e u(B;^ ￿i)dG(￿j) if ^ ￿i < ^ ￿j
Note that, by choosing large T and small ￿(T=2); we can make Wia(^ ￿ij^ ￿j) arbitrarily close
to f Wia(^ ￿ij^ ￿j):
First, I claim that, if T is large and ￿(T=2) is su¢ ciently small, ^ ￿i(^ ￿j) is non increasing
in ^ ￿j: To see the claim, observe that
d
d^ ￿j




e u(B;^ ￿i)g(^ ￿j) if ^ ￿i ￿ ^ ￿j
e u(B;^ ￿j)g(^ ￿j) if ^ ￿i < ^ ￿j
:
Thus, d
d^ ￿j[f WiR(^ ￿ij^ ￿j) ￿ f WiS(^ ￿ij^ ￿j)] > 0: Then, since WiR(^ ￿ij^ ￿j) ￿ WiS(^ ￿ij^ ￿j) is continuous in
^ ￿i; if T is large and ￿(T=2) is su¢ ciently small, ^ ￿i(^ ￿j) is non increasing in ^ ￿j:
Second, I claim that if T is large and ￿(T=2) is su¢ ciently small, ^ ￿i(￿min) = ￿max: To
see the claim, note that f WiS(^ ￿ij￿min) > f WiR(^ ￿ij￿min) = 0: Hence, if T is large and ￿(T=2) is
su¢ ciently small, WiR(^ ￿ij￿min) < WiS(^ ￿ij￿min) for all ^ ￿i:
Third, I claim that if T is large and ￿(T=2) is su¢ ciently small ^ ￿i(￿max) < ￿max: To see the
claim, note that f WiR(￿maxj￿max) =
R
￿j e u(B;￿j)dG(￿j) = f WiS(￿maxj￿max) =
R
￿j e u(B;^ ￿i)dG(￿j):
Note that f WiR(￿maxj￿max) < WiR(￿maxj￿max) and f WiS(￿maxj￿max) = WiS(￿maxj￿max): Hence,
if T is large and ￿(T=2) is su¢ ciently small, WiR(￿maxj￿max) > WiS(￿maxj￿max) and thus
^ ￿i(￿max) 6= ￿max:
Finally, observe that ^ ￿i(^ ￿j) is continuous in ^ ￿j and, by symmetry we know ^ ￿j(^ ￿i) has
the same property as ^ ￿i(^ ￿j). Then, the above three claims imply that if T is large and
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j < ￿max such that ^ ￿i(^ ￿j(^ ￿
￿￿
i )) = ^ ￿
￿￿
i ;
^ ￿j(^ ￿i(^ ￿
￿￿
j )) = ^ ￿
￿￿
j : By symmetry, ^ ￿
￿￿
i = ^ ￿
￿￿
j = ^ ￿
OPS
: Q.E.D.
9.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose both agents follow the same cut o⁄strategy and let ^ ￿ be the symmetric cut o⁄type.
















Let e z(^ ￿) = WiR(^ ￿) ￿ WiS(^ ￿).
e z(^ ￿) =
Z
￿j>^ ￿




[Wi;RS(￿j) ￿ Wi;SS(^ ￿;￿j)]dG(￿j):
First, I show that whenever there exists ^ ￿
￿￿
such that e z(^ ￿
￿￿
) = 0; it has to be unique and
^ ￿
￿￿
= ^ ￿OPS. Observe that, if ￿j < ^ ￿; Wi;SS(^ ￿;￿j) is the same as the expected payo⁄ of the
prize designer in which only agent j solves the problem with the safe method. Thus, for any
￿j < ^ ￿;
Wi;RS(￿j) ￿ Wi;SS(^ ￿;￿j) > 0:
Then,
e z(￿max) = Wi;RS(￿j) ￿ Wi;SS(￿max;￿j) > 0:
Since Wi;SR(^ ￿) is decreasing in ^ ￿; WiRR ￿ Wi;SR(^ ￿) is increasing in ^ ￿: Hence, whenever
there exists ^ ￿ such that e z(^ ￿) = 0;
e z(￿min) = Wi;RR ￿ Wi;SR(￿min) < 0:
Then, it is easy to see that, for small ^ ￿ such that Wi;RR < Wi;SR(^ ￿); e z(^ ￿) is increasing in
^ ￿: On the other hand, once ^ ￿ becomes large enough so that Wi;RR > Wi;SR(^ ￿); then e z(^ ￿) > 0
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￿￿
such that e z(^ ￿
￿￿
) = 0; it has to be unique.
Then, by observation 1-(ii), we know that ^ ￿
￿￿
= ^ ￿OPS:
Now, let ^ ￿
￿
be the equilibrium cuto⁄ type. I show that if T is large and ￿(T=2) is
su¢ ciently small, then ^ ￿
￿
< ^ ￿OPS. The proof consists of 4 steps.
First, let us rewrite e z(^ ￿
￿








) + (1 ￿ G(^ ￿
￿






















Vi;RR + Vi;SR(^ ￿
￿









Vi;RS(￿j) ￿ Wi;SS(^ ￿
￿
;￿j)]dG(￿j):





;￿j) < 0 for any ￿j < ^ ￿
￿
:
To see the claim, let ￿(t￿
ijaiaj;i) be the probability that agent i ￿nds a solution at t￿
i

























































































































j < 0: Thus, Wi;RS(￿j) ￿
e v(B)
v(x)Vi;RS(￿j) ￿ Wi;SS(^ ￿
￿
;￿j) < 0 for any ￿j < ^ ￿
￿
:




To see the claim, let z(^ ￿;￿) be z(^ ￿) given ￿: Suppose z(^ ￿;￿) = k: Observe that, by
choosing large T and small ￿(T=2); we can make Vi;RR and Vi;RS(￿j) arbitrarily close to 0.
Hence, by choosing ￿0 with larger T and small ￿(T=2); we have z(^ ￿;￿0) < k: Thus, given
any ￿ < ￿max; by choosing large T and small ￿(T=2); we can make z(￿;￿) < 0: Then, since
z(^ ￿;￿) > 0 for su¢ ciently large ^ ￿, by choosing large T and small ￿(T=2); we can make ^ ￿
￿
arbitrarily close to ￿max and G(^ ￿
￿
) arbitrarily close to 1.
Step 3. If T is large and ￿(T=2) is su¢ ciently small, e z(^ ￿
￿
) < 0:




v(x)Vi;RS(￿j) ￿ Wi;SS(^ ￿
￿
;￿j) < 0 for large T and small
￿(T=2): On the other hand, step 2 says that, by choosing large T and small ￿(T=2); we can
make 1 ￿ G(^ ￿
￿
) arbitrarily close to 0. Hence, e z(^ ￿
￿
) < 0 for large T and small ￿(T=2):
Step 4. ^ ￿OPS > ^ ￿
￿
if T is large and ￿(T=2) is su¢ ciently small.
To see the claim, recall that e z(^ ￿) = 0 has unique solution ^ ￿OPS and e z(^ ￿) > 0 for ￿ > ^ ￿OPS
and e z(^ ￿) < 0 for ￿ < ^ ￿OPS: Therefore, if e z(^ ￿
￿
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